What Happened
On the morning of November 26, 2011, a Cirrus Design SR20, N223CD, lifted off from Marion Regional Airport (MZZ) in Marion, Indiana, at approximately 0830 central standard time. The pilot had three passengers aboard and was headed northwest to DuPage Airport (DPA) near West Chicago, Illinois, a flight of roughly 150 miles. Before departure, the pilot spoke with the line service representative at MZZ, who fueled the airplane to full tanks. When the topic of weather came up, the pilot told him he was aware of conditions west of Chicago and that VFR was forecast at their estimated time of arrival. He sounded confident. The airplane departed without a flight plan, squawking 1200 on the transponder.
What the pilot had logged was 207 total hours, 114 of those in the SR20 specifically. He held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating, earned on April 22, 2010. He did not hold an instrument rating. His logbook showed 3.1 hours of simulated instrument time and, notably, 28.6 hours listed as actual instrument flight time. But investigators looked closely at that second number. For every flight where actual instrument time was entered, the number matched the total flight time for that entire flight leg, hour for hour. FAA regulations at 14 CFR 61.51 only allow a pilot to log instrument time when the aircraft is being controlled solely by reference to the instruments. The actual instrument hours he carried in that logbook almost certainly were not legitimate instrument currency. There was also no record of a formal preflight weather briefing through flight service, and no record of a DUATS login before departure.
Radar picked up the airplane around 0942, approximately 3 miles east of the Chicago Heights VOR at 2,400 feet msl, tracking northwest. It held that altitude and heading until around 0957, when it turned right and established on a north course about 5 miles south of DPA at 1,600 feet msl. At 0958:05, the pilot called DPA tower and asked about landing. The controller told him the airport was currently under IFR. About 30 seconds later, the pilot said he had inadvertently flown over the airport. The controller cleared him to reverse course and land at DPA. The pilot acknowledged. But by 1002, the pilot called back and said he no longer had the airport in sight. The controller gave him a heading. At 1004, the pilot asked about alternate airports with better visibility because, as he put it, he did not want to get in there and get “stuck all day.” The controller mentioned Chicago Executive Airport (PWK), about 20 miles northeast, which was reporting VFR. When asked if he wanted help navigating to PWK, the pilot replied, “I’m still trying to decide if I want to try to land at DuPage or not . . . would you think that’s a good idea or not.” He then told the controller the flight was “in and out of the clouds.” When the controller asked directly whether he was IFR qualified, the pilot answered that he was in IFR training and had “let this get around” him. At 1008, the DPA controller handed the flight off to Chicago TRACON.
Chicago TRACON made contact at 1012:39 and began providing weather conditions at airports in the area. At 1015:28, the pilot said he would head to PWK. But at 1022:49, roughly seven minutes later and now about 2.5 miles west-northwest of Lake in the Hills Airport (3CK), the pilot changed course again. He told the controller he did not want to “mess with the weather” and wanted to get out of it and did not want to get stuck. The controller, hearing that the pilot was no longer inbound to PWK, transmitted “frequency change is approved.” The pilot acknowledged at 1024:23. That was the last radio transmission received from N223CD.
Radar continued tracking the airplane for another two minutes. At 1021, it was on a north heading at approximately 1,800 feet msl. Around 1023:03, it entered a left turn to a west heading. Around 1024:03, it reversed to a right turn. The right turn continued, gradually at first. By 1025:08, the airplane was tracking approximately east at 2,000 feet msl. By 1025:31, it was on a southeast heading at 2,400 feet msl. Eighteen seconds after that, it was on a south heading at 2,100 feet msl. The turn was tightening. At 1025:58, it was tracking west at 1,800 feet msl. The last radar return came at 1026:22. The airplane appeared to be on a south heading, still at approximately 1,800 feet msl, about 0.4 miles northwest of where it would hit the ground.
A witness within half a mile of the impact site heard an airplane overhead but could not see it through the overcast. He said it sounded like it was doing aerobatics, climbing and descending. Less than a minute later he looked up and saw it south of his position, pitched approximately 70 degrees nose-down. A second witness at the same location described the same sound, the same invisible airplane above the clouds, and then the same sight: the airplane breaking out below the overcast in a 60 to 70-degree nose-down attitude. The airplane struck a tree and an open agricultural field about 4 miles north-northwest of Lake in the Hills Airport. It was 1026 in the morning. The pilot and all three passengers were fatally injured. A ticket for an Indianapolis Colts football game scheduled for the following day was found in the debris field.
Investigation Findings
The wreckage told the story of a high-energy, nearly vertical impact. Multiple tree limbs up to 4 inches in diameter showed fresh breaks across a 45-by-45-foot area immediately north of the primary tree strike. The debris field ran roughly 400 feet long and 85 feet wide, oriented approximately 009 degrees magnetic. The engine separated from the airframe entirely and came to rest inverted about 155 feet from the main wreckage. The propeller assembly separated aft of the flange and ended up 131 feet from the main wreckage. The vertical stabilizer, with the rudder still attached, separated and landed about 30 feet north. Both wings had separated. The left wing’s outboard section came to rest 55 feet east of the main wreckage. The cabin area was compromised and the fuselage was fragmented. Postaccident examination of the engine, airframe, and flight controls found no anomalies consistent with any preimpact failure or malfunction. The airplane was not broken before it hit the ground.
Weather data painted a clear picture of what the pilot flew into. An AIRMET Sierra advisory warning of possible IFR conditions had been issued at 0845 and was valid until 1500, covering northern Illinois, eastern Iowa, and southern Wisconsin. The DPA Terminal Area Forecast, amended at 0915, was calling for an 800-foot overcast by 1000. The actual DPA observation at 0952 showed a 900-foot overcast with 3 miles visibility in light rain and mist. By the time of the accident, the DPA observation at 1029 showed 1-3/4 miles visibility in light rain and mist under a 900-foot overcast. The nearest VFR airport, PWK, was 23 miles east and had 7 miles visibility with a 1,300-foot overcast at 1024. Two pilots on an IFR training flight from Rockford to Lake in the Hills that morning later told investigators they were in solid IMC at 5,000 feet msl and did not break out of the clouds until 1,300 feet msl, about 400 feet above the ground, on an instrument approach into 3CK. The accident site was squarely inside the IMC layer.
The radar profile of the final minutes was consistent with a classic graveyard spiral developing inside the clouds. The gentle right turn that began shortly after the pilot’s last transmission gradually tightened over roughly 90 seconds into what radar data showed as a steep spiral, with the airplane climbing approximately 2,500 feet per minute before entering an approximate 3,600-feet-per-minute descent. A non-instrument-rated pilot without genuine instrument currency, in solid IMC, had lost control of the airplane. The PARACHUTE SYSTEM that is a well-known feature of the Cirrus SR20 was not activated. The deployment altitude and the nearly vertical terminal attitude would have made a successful deployment unlikely at that stage regardless.
NTSB Probable Cause
The noninstrument-rated pilot’s decision to continue flight in instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in the pilot’s spatial disorientation and loss of control of the airplane.
Safety Lessons
Four people did not come home from a Thanksgiving weekend trip because a series of small decisions compounded into a fatal outcome. Each of those decisions had an earlier point where the chain could have been broken.
- No weather briefing is not a strategy, it’s a gamble. There was no record of a flight service briefing and no DUATS login before departure. The AIRMET Sierra covering northern Illinois that morning was issued at 0845 and was sitting in the system for anyone who looked. The amended DPA TAF, calling for an 800-foot overcast by 1000, was out at 0915, before the airplane ever reached the Chicago area. A formal briefing would have surfaced both. The pilot instead relied on his own read of the forecast and told the lineman conditions were expected to be VFR at arrival. They were not.
- Logging instrument time does not create instrument capability. The pilot’s 28.6 hours of logged “actual” instrument time almost certainly represented time spent flying in IMC without being solely on instruments, entered incorrectly as full-flight instrument time. And 3.1 hours of simulated instrument time, without an instrument rating and without genuine hood work, does not build the scan, the cross-check, or the discipline to manage spatial disorientation in actual IMC. When the vestibular system says the airplane is wings-level and the instruments say otherwise, a pilot with 3.1 hours of simulated time does not have the tools to resolve that conflict.
- The decision to land is almost always the right one when the alternative is flying further into IMC. The pilot had DPA in front of him, and a controller who had already cleared him to land. He chose not to land because he did not want to be delayed. He then flew another 26 minutes in deteriorating IMC, declined two alternate airports with better conditions, and ultimately lost control of the airplane. The weather was not going to get better by flying around in it. A Thanksgiving Day delay at DuPage Airport is survivable. What happened 4 miles north-northwest of Lake in the Hills was not.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What is VFR into IMC and why is it so dangerous?
A: VFR into IMC means a pilot operating under Visual Flight Rules enters conditions where flight by visual reference is no longer possible, typically clouds or fog. Without an instrument rating and genuine instrument training, a pilot loses the ability to determine the aircraft’s attitude and orientation. The vestibular system generates false sensations, and without the discipline to override them with instrument indications, loss of control typically follows within minutes. Studies have shown that the average non-instrument-rated pilot entering IMC loses control of the aircraft within approximately 178 seconds.
Q: Could the Cirrus CAPS parachute system have saved the occupants?
A: The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) is designed to be deployed in emergencies, including loss of control situations. However, deployment requires sufficient altitude and a controlled enough attitude for the parachute to arrest the descent before ground impact. By the time the airplane broke out below the clouds in a 60 to 70-degree nose-down attitude, the altitude remaining was almost certainly insufficient for a successful deployment. CAPS is most effective when activated early, before a steep spiral fully develops, not at the bottom of a 3,600-foot-per-minute descent a few hundred feet above the ground.
Q: Can a non-instrument-rated pilot legally fly in marginal conditions?
A: In Class E airspace, VFR minima require 1,000-foot cloud clearance above, 500 feet below, and 2,000 feet horizontally from any cloud formation, with at least 3 miles visibility. In Class D airspace around a towered airport, a cloud ceiling of at least 1,000 feet agl and 3 miles visibility are required to take off or land VFR. Conditions at DPA at the time of the accident were well below those minima. A Special VFR clearance can allow operations in Class D airspace with 1 mile visibility and clear of clouds, but it must be requested by the pilot and cannot be suggested by the controller.
Q: Why did the pilot’s logged instrument time not reflect actual instrument capability?
A: Investigators found that for each flight entry where the pilot logged actual instrument time, the number entered exactly matched the total flight time for that leg. FAA regulations only allow a pilot to log instrument flight time when controlling the aircraft solely by reference to instruments. Logging the entire duration of a VFR flight as instrument time is not permitted. The pilot had 3.1 hours of properly logged simulated instrument time, a fraction of the minimum 40 hours required to even take an instrument rating checkride, let alone develop the proficiency needed to manage spatial disorientation in actual IMC.
Q: What should a VFR pilot do when they inadvertently enter IMC?
A: The immediate priority is to establish wings-level flight by reference to the attitude indicator and begin a standard-rate 180-degree turn back toward VFR conditions. Pilots should contact ATC immediately, declare an emergency if necessary, and request radar vectors to VFR conditions or an instrument approach if a qualified pilot is not available to take control. Altitude is your friend, avoid descending into terrain. Every VFR pilot should practice partial-panel flying and unusual attitude recoveries with an instructor, and should know the three words that can save their life in this situation: declare an emergency.
