On the evening of January 29, 2025, a tragic midair collision occurred over the Potomac River near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). The accident involved a PSA Airlines Bombardier CRJ700, operating as American Airlines Flight 5342, and a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, operating as callsign PAT 25.
THE PLAN
American Airlines Flight 5342 (N709PS) was en route from Wichita, Kansas, to Washington, D.C., carrying 60 passenger and 4 crewmembers. The NTSB has not confirmed which pilot was flying the aircraft at the time of the crash.
U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk was carrying three crewmembers and was conducting a combined an annual and night vision goggle (NVG) check ride for one of the pilots. Typically, the pilot being evaluated sits in the right seat while the instructor sits in the left seat. The instructor pilot handles the radio calls while the other pilot focuses on flying the aircraft.
In complex airspaces like Washington Reagan National Airport (DCA), air traffic controllers follow specific deconfliction procedures to ensure safe separation between aircraft. The deconfliction plan for the UH-60 Blackhawk (Pat 25) and the CRJ (Flight 5342) was based on altitude separation, route structure, and visual separation protocols.
The Blackhawk’s Routing (Pat 25)
- The UH-60 Blackhawk was following Helicopter Route 1, a designated path along the Potomac River.
- South of Memorial Bridge, helicopters are expected to maintain a maximum altitude of 200 feet unless otherwise instructed
- The helicopter routing follows the river south of Reagan National and crosses the approach path to runway 33 and runway 01.
- This means the controllers likely relied heavily on visual separation as the primary means for deconflicting aircraft in this portion of the airspace.
- The NTSB confirmed that the Blackhawk was using a VHF radio frequency to communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC), but this was a different frequency than the CRJ was using.
The CRJ-700’s Approach to DCA (Flight 5342)
- Flight 5342 was initially on a visual approach to Runway 01 but due to the heavy volume of traffic into DCA, the controller asked if they could accept an approach to Runway 33 and the pilots agreed.
- The visual approach to Runway 33 is a circling maneuver where the pilots will proceed inbound aligned with Runway 01 and then begin a right turn near the Woodrow Wilson Bridge, followed shortly thereafter by a left turn to align with Runway 33.
- This can be a challenging maneuver, especially at night, and would require the concentrated effort of both pilots.
THE FLIGHT
* all times in pm, Eastern Standard Time
~8:15 The CRJ began descending from its cruising altitude of 37,000 feet
~8:30 The Blackhawk was maneuvering near Leonville, Maryland, before proceeding southbound along designated helicopter routes over the Potomac River toward Washington, D.C.
~8:33 The Blackhawk crew requested clearance to travel along Helicopter Routes 1 to 4, which was approved by air traffic control (ATC).
8:39:10 Potomac Approach cleared the CRJ for the visual approach to Runway 1 at DCA.
8:40:46 The CRJ rolled out of a left turn, established on the approach for Runway 1
8:43:48 The Blackhawk was ~1 nautical mile (NM) west of Key Bridge. The pilot flying indicated they were at 300 feet. The instructor pilot indicated they were at 400 feet. Neither pilot made a comment discussing an altitude discrepancy.
8:44:27 The Blackhawk instructor pilot indicated the aircraft was at 300 feet descending to 200 feet. Simultaneously, ATC offered the CRJ crew the option to switch to Runway 33, which they accepted.
8:45:30 The Blackhawk passed over the Memorial Bridge and the instructor pilot told the pilot flying that they were at 300 feet and needed to descend. The pilot flying said they would descend to 200 feet.
** Note: if the instructor pilot’s altimeter was reading 100 feet higher than the pilot flying’s altimeter, then it’s possible the pilot flying thought they were at the correct altitude while the instructor thought they were high.
~2 MINUTES BEFORE THE COLLISION
8:46:01 ATC issued a traffic advisory to the Blackhawk crew regarding the CRJ’s position, stating, “PAT 25, traffic just south of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge is a CRJ at 1,200 feet circling to Runway 33”.
** Note: The phrase, “circling to Runway 33” was not heard on the Blackhawk’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR), indicating the crew may not have received the full message. This means they might not have expected or planned to look for an aircraft on approach to runway 33.
8:46:29 The CRJ received a 1,000-foot automated altitude callout.
8:46:47 The tower cleared another aircraft for immediate departure from Runway 1.
8:47:27 The Blackhawk passed the southern tip of Hains Point.
8:47:28 The CRJ was at an altitude of 516 feet and began a left turn to align with Runway 33 for landing.
8:47:39 ATC once again asked the Blackhawk: “PAT 25, do you have the CRJ in sight?”
8:47:40 The CRJ received an automated traffic advisory from the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) stating “Traffic, Traffic”
8:47:42 A radio transmission from ATC was heard in both aircraft, directing the Blackhawk to pass behind the CRJ. “Pass behind the CRJ”
** Note: As ATC was making this radio call, the Blackhawk instructor pilot also keyed the microphone, meaning the Blackhawk pilots might not have heard “pass behind the”.
8:47:44 The Blackhawk instructor pilot said “Traffic in sight, request visual separation”, which was approved by the DCA tower controller. The Blackhawk instructor pilot then told the pilot flying they believed that ATC was asking for them to move left toward the east bank of the river.
8:47:52 7 seconds before impact, the CRJ rolled out on final for Runway 33.
** Note: During the left turn to final it would likely have been very difficult for the CRJ pilots to see the dark Blackhawk helicopter below them with a dark river background. If the CRJ First Officer was the pilot flying, his visual focus more likely would have been on the runway to ensure a safe and successful landing and that means spotting the Blackhawk would have been even more difficult for the Captain seated in the left seat.
8:47:58 1 second before impact, the CRJ pilot flying pulled back on the controls and the elevators were deflected near the maximum nose up travel limit. This indicated the CRJ pilots likely saw the Blackhawk at the very last second and made a desperate attempt to avoid the collision.
The radio altitude of the Blackhawk at the time of the collision was 278 feet and had been steady for the previous 5 seconds, indicating they most likely never saw the CRJ prior to the collision.
** Note: There are some discrepancies with the data the NTSB has reviewed for the Blackhawk’s barometric altimeters and that is why they have not released the altitude for the Blackhawk’s route at this time.
THE SWISS CHEESE MODEL
The Swiss Cheese Model, developed by James Reason, is a framework for understanding how accidents occur despite multiple layers of safety barriers. The model envisions each safety barrier as a slice of Swiss cheese, with holes representing potential weaknesses. When these holes align across multiple layers, an accident occurs.
In this accident, several holes in safety barriers aligned that the NTSB will need to consider as part of the investigation:
1. High Traffic Complexity
- The airspace near DCA was highly congested, leading to rapid sequencing changes, tight spacing between aircraft, and increased complexity in maintaining safe separation
- The congestion of aircraft on approach to Runway 1 led to the controller asking the CRJ if they could accept a different runway. Of note, the controller initially asked the aircraft in front of the CRJ if they could accept Runway 1 and they said “unable”. As a result, the controller asked the CRJ (AA Flight 5342).
- The Blackhawk was transiting through airspace heavily used by commercial aircraft, increasing risk.
2. Over-Reliance on Visual Separation
- At night, in a dense urban environment, visual separation is unreliable due to city lights and reduced visibility.
- The Blackhawk pilots were likely using night vision goggles (NVGs), which can restrict peripheral vision, while also making a crosscheck of the altimeter more difficult because the pilot must look under the NVGs to do so.
- It can be easy to mistake one aircraft for another when several aircraft are operating in the same airspace, even while using NVGs.
- The CRJ pilots would likely have a difficult time visually locating the Blackhawk due to the nighttime conditions and their focus on the circling approach maneuver to Runway 33.
3. Altitude Conflict & Last-Minute Instructions
- The Blackhawk’s two barometric altimeters showed conflicting altitude readings, creating uncertainty between the pilots about the aircraft’s actual height.
- Key communications from ATC, such as “circling to Runway 33,” may not have been fully received by the Black Hawk crew due to radio interference, resulting in the crew possibly not expecting to see the CRJ on approach to Runway 33.
- The Blackhawk crew accepted responsibility for visual separation, but NVGs and urban lighting likely made it difficult to accurately identify and track the CRJ.
- The CRJ was descending into the Blackhawk’s altitude layer.
- The Blackhawk may have been flying higher than the prescribed 200-foot limit.
- ATC’s late attempt to clarify the deconfliction by instructing the Blackhawk to “pass behind” the CRJ was likely not fully received due to radio interference.
- ADS-B Out Non-Functionality: The Blackhawk was equipped with ADS-B Out, yet it was not transmitting at the time, possibly limiting positional situational awareness.
FINAL THOUGHTS
This tragic accident underscores the challenges of managing mixed-use airspace in highly congested areas. The fact that helicopter routes intersect directly with final approach paths for commercial jets, relying on visual separation is concerning.
The FAA has already implemented temporary restrictions on helicopter flights in the area, but long-term changes must be considered, including stricter ATC oversight for helicopters in mixed-use corridors.
Ultimately, this accident highlights the necessity of proactive rather than reactive safety measures. The aviation industry cannot afford to wait for accidents to expose vulnerabilities; instead, airspace management must evolve to prevent tragedies like this from occurring in the future.
34 Comments
You always do a great job explaining these tragic accidents. I am a fairly new pilot. And I keep safety a priority, always continuing to learn my limitations and to abide by them. You have been a great sense of always being alert and never thinking to myself. It can’t happen to me. Continue to put out the great information.
Thanks so much!
Very comprehensive. Great work.
Thanks, Roger!
Hoover, one of your comments
you touched upon how hard it is
to identify aircraft at night but
you don’t consider the possibility
that perhaps the Blackhawk in
reality was looking at the plane
that was just ahead of the CRJ
heading to runway 1 and thought
they were passing behind the
CRJ as instructed by the tower.
Unfortunately we will never
know…
I’ve considered that possibility. As you said, no one will probably ever know what they were looking at.
Nicely done. Excellent debrief including the photos. Really like the “resources” links to reports and flight data etc. A site like this takes a lot of work so I thank
you! Hope you keep the YouTube channel.
Thanks, Jerry! Glad you like it. The YouTube channel isn’t going anywhere!
Two BIG points: Visual seperation was not appropriate, and collision avoidance technologythrough autopilot override needs to be developed (like Tesla).
Thanks for sharing that perspective Pete
I agree re: visual separation. Once the controller saw PAT 25 was not showing signs of avoiding the Blue Streak jet, he should have made a positive course correction to the Blackhawk.
With the controller handling both helos + T/Os and landings, he wasn’t able to pay as close attention to that as would have been optimal, so I’m not 100% on the controllers case over that.
Thorough, objective reporting as always. Critical analysis of mistakes or faults in any system hopefully will prevent future occurrences.
Thanks!
Your clarity and precision of explanation is appreciated, as always. Great News Letter – I thank you for all the work and effort!!
Glad you like the newsletter. Stay tuned…more cool stuff in the works!
ADS-B could have told the helicopter pilot how to avoid the DCA collision, even absent visual contact. The airliner also could have avoided collision given this information. We have been told that the helicopter had its ADS-B off. According to the Federal Register on 7/18/2019 “Section 91.225, paragraph (f), is revised to provide relief from the mandatory transmit requirement for sensitive missions for the purpose of national defense , homeland security, intelligence and law enforcement where transmitting ADS-B-OUT would compromise safety or the security of the mission.” It also states: “FAA does not believe that the use of such exemptions should become routine and should be limited to areas in which such relief represents integral mission need of the requestor.” It also states that each agency “must contact the FAA for authorization to conduct these broad mission sets without transmitting.” The specific mission most commonly cited is aircraft flying in formation when all aircraft are transmitting, resulting in repeated audio and visual alerts that aircraft are within close proximity creating distractions for controllers. It is obvious that having ADS-B-OUT turned off is what compromised safety and did not meet the FAA’s exemption criteria. Having ADS-B-OUT off could be viewed as criminal negligence. Unless it was required by routine army operating procedure, in which the negligence rises to the anonymous level of bureaucracy. Or unless ADS-B was not even installed in the helicopter. Two questions: Did the army obtain authorization from FAA to conduct these flights around DCA? Second: was ADS-B-OUT even installed in the helicopter?
Your conclusions coincide with what I have been commenting with my brother, also a commercial pilot; related to the Suisse Cheese Model; in short, if you play around with fire, you will eventually get burnt. Was it really essential to have aircraft crossing the final approach to a busy airport at night with only some 200 feet of altitude separation? And a question: Where both Black Hawk pilots using the night googles?
I also took a course on crisis management and hostage negotiations with the FBI; and got to manage a training incident, back in 1990, and I will never forget the instructor telling us that the ideal terrorist weapons where passenger jets full of fuel at the start of a long distance flight. Then came 9/11, before we changed the way things were done.
What is the explanation for the helicopter’s ADSB-Out not transmitting?
We are waiting for the NTSB to look into this.
You always do a fantastic job in
Your debriefs. I am not a pilot, but
Have always had a huge interest
In aviation. What would cause the
Pilot flying, and the instructor pilot’s
Altimeters to give two different
Altitudes. And if flying under.NVG
in urban areas is that difficult and
I’m sure it is. Why would both pilots
Be flying NVG? Why not have the
Instructor pilot flying under normal
Conditions to have more peripheral
Vision? I stated earlier I’m not a
And I’m sure there’s a good
Explanation
Not sure about the altimeters. It’s common practice in other aircraft for the entire crew to be on NVGs at the same time, so I’d assume the same for Blackhawk crews.
I’ve heard from another commentator (I can’t recall whom) that the rulebook for UH-60s is the two altimeters have to be within 75′ of each other when doing your pre-flight checks.
It seems to me when the PAT 25 pilots called out altitudes with a delta of 100′, they should have at least verified the proper barometric setting. That part has me scratching my head.
Hoover,
No mention of the Blackhawk’s ADSB. I have heard reports it was off.
There are reports of that. The NTSB is still investigating.
Very thorough and factual debrief using verified published information. I really like the news letter format. You and blancolirio are my go to channels for aviation accident info. Keep up the great work and stay safe up there!
Hi Hoover,
As a devoted Patreon member of your Pilot Debrief on You Tube, I was surprised when I opened this professionally created newsletter. I visualize it as
as a monthly column in Flying magazine.
I was glad to read in the above comments that your You Tube channel isn’t going anywhere. When receiving information pertaining to aviation incidents, I
like the personal touch that you bring to your videos. It’s more like learning from fellow pilots while hanger flying.
It will be interesting to see how you will integrate the two.
Greg – thanks for your kind words. The website and newsletter allows me to cover a lot more incidents that I don’t have the time to make videos for. My goal has always been to provide value to help improve aviation safety and I hope this website helps achieve that. Thanks so much for your support!
Steve from the UK
Your you tube channel is brilliant and I really enjoy watching and listening to your debriefs. Long may they
continue, this news news letter is a fantastic addition.
Thank you for all your efforts in making these mishaps more understanding.
Here’s looking forward to next news letter.
Don’t burn yourself out and over do it. These snippets of news are like little gems.
Thanks again
Steve,
I certainly appreciate your video debriefs but I actually retain information better if I can read it. So, I very much look forward to future written debrief reports. Thanks for what you do.
As a low time pilot myself, I appreciate the detail in these debriefs. As I watch them on a regular basis, It helps me to maintain a higher standard while flying !
Excellent job on the website! You’re really adding value to your offerings, “Hoover.”
As a former USAF flight safety officer, I appreciate what you are doing to promote safe flying and to explain the factors leading to mishaps.
Keep up the good work!
Visual separation worked for 40 years plus, but when I flew a helicopter downtown there, I generally avoided route 04 if there were any 33 OPS. I also flew in that area two different assignments (not at the unit in question)–both unaided, and Aided (goggles). I would often flip my goggles up downtown to increase situational awareness and have a better view of traffic–it just depended and took some judgment when – where to de-goggle (announced to the crew as well when you did).
If I didn’t clearly have 33 traffic in sight–either north or south of the final over Bolling (Anacostia), I would circle in place. I would absolutely avoid route 04 if 33 Ops were anticipated (strong NW winds). An aircraft going back to Davison AAF could have flown down through Springfield and south, but, traffic aside, this is the more direct or elegant route.
ATC for the most part relied on the helicopters for deconfliction. The planes, even during the day, would just drive without pause on their approach paths–they really had no other choice and seeing helicopters flying low will turning and in the landing phase is admittedly almost impossible (I flew FW also). For better or worse, at that moment—the onus was mostly on the helicopter crew to see and avoid,. The IP on the aircraft made a very strange and non-standard radio call “request visual separation?” Never encountered that call in my 8 years flying in that environment and doesn’t really make sense–they would ask you “to maintain visual”, etc. 200′ is a hard, hard altitude. We would get on people for being 10′ high. Very sad.
Thanks as always for the thoughtful and caring reviews. This accident makes me angry because it never should have happened, but it sounds like these close encounters have become the norm so it was a matter of time. I am dumbfounded at some who think a few hundred feet of vertical separation or visual separation at night in a maze of cultural lighting is acceptable. The most amazing thing is everyone is treating this as if both are fixed wing aircraft. They were not. This situation could be solved simply by having he helicopter hold their position until the flight path was clear. Thanks for all your efforts to spread the word so that we can be safer pilots.