How a Toxic Captain, Ignored Warnings, and Poor CRM Led to Pakistan’s Deadliest Domestic Crash
On the morning of July 28, 2010, Airblue Flight 202, an Airbus A321 (AP-BJB), departed Jinnah International Airport (KHI) in Karachi on a routine domestic flight to Benazir Bhutto International Airport (ISB) in Islamabad. The flight carried 146 passengers and six crew members, with Captain Pervez Iqbal Chaudhary, 61, in command, and First Officer Muntajib Ahmed, 34, as pilot monitoring.
The aircraft never made it to the runway. Instead, it slammed into the Margalla Hills, just 9.6 nautical miles from the airport, killing all 152 people on board. What should have been a routine circling approach turned into Pakistan’s deadliest aviation disaster, caused not by weather or mechanical failure, but by a captain who refused to listen—to his crew, to air traffic control, and to the aircraft itself.
The Captain’s Authority – When Experience Becomes a Liability
Captain Pervez Iqbal Chaudhary had a long career with over 25,000 flight hours, including more than 1,000 hours on the Airbus A320 series. He had previously flown for Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) but left after reaching the mandatory retirement age of 60. Airblue hired him at 61, as their policy allowed pilots to fly until 65.
Despite his experience, there were major red flags about his fitness to fly:
🚨 He had been hospitalized just two months before the crash for diabetes and heart issues.
🚨 Pakistan’s aviation regulations barred diabetic pilots from flying, yet he still passed his medical exam just two weeks before the crash.
🚨 In the cockpit, he displayed arrogance and a toxic leadership style, berating his 34-year-old First Officer, Muntajib Ahmed, during the flight.
For over an hour after takeoff, the Captain quizzed the FO in a “humiliating” manner, creating a tense and intimidating cockpit environment.
As a result, Ahmed became passive and submissive, failing to challenge the Captain—even when the aircraft’s warnings screamed for action.
The Approach: A Complex Circling Maneuver
Islamabad’s Runway 12 was in use due to strong winds, but the airport had no instrument approach for it because of mountains to the north. Pilots had to fly the ILS approach to Runway 30, then circle visually to land on Runway 12—a maneuver requiring high situational awareness.
The correct procedure was:
1️⃣ Fly the ILS to Runway 30 down to 2,510 feet (Minimum Descent Altitude).
2️⃣ Upon seeing the runway, turn right 45 degrees, fly parallel to the runway at a safe distance, then turn left onto base and final for Runway 12.
3️⃣ Stay within 4.3 nautical miles of the runway—this is the visual maneuvering area.
🚨 The problem? The Captain ignored this procedure.
The Captain’s Dangerous Plan
Instead of following Airblue’s standard circling approach, the Captain:
🔴 Planned to turn left instead of right, flying south of the field—directly opposite of what was recommended.
🔴 Entered unauthorized waypoints into the FMS, essentially trying to automate a visual maneuver—a risky and non-standard technique.
🔴 Ignored ATC’s denial of his request to circle south of the field.
Instead of using selected guidance (manual heading changes) for the visual circling approach, the Captain forced the First Officer to program waypoints for a fully managed navigation mode.
This meant the aircraft was flying a pre-set route—even when visual maneuvering required flexibility.
Despite how dangerous and non-standard this plan was, the First Officer did not question the Captain’s decisions.
Final Approach: A Chain of Deadly Errors
As Flight 202 approached Islamabad, the crew faced worsening weather:
🌧 Rain and low visibility (3 miles)
🌫 Clouds obscuring parts of the airport
At 4,500 feet, the Captain asked ATC—again—if he could circle south of the field.
🚫 ATC denied the request.
At 2,500 feet, the Captain descended even lower to 2,300 feet—below the minimum safe altitude.
⚠️ The First Officer, despite correcting him once earlier, said nothing.
At 5 miles from the airport, ATC warned them about an approaching restricted area.
🚨 The Captain ignored this too.
Then came the first Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) alert:
🔊 “TERRAIN AHEAD.”
The First Officer finally spoke up:
“Sir, higher ground ahead! Sir, turn left!”
But the Captain, already confused by his incorrect navigation mode, did nothing.
The Last 70 Seconds – A Disaster Unfolds
At 4:40:28 UTC, with Margalla Hills dead ahead, the aircraft was still flying in the wrong direction.
🚨 EGPWS issued 21 terrain warnings in the next 70 seconds.
🚨 The FO warned the Captain multiple times to turn and pull up.
🚨 ATC asked if they were still visual.
The Captain, in his final arrogant mistake, lied to ATC:
“Airblue 202, visual with the ground.”
But he was not visual with the runway.
The Final Moments
With less than 10 seconds to impact, the Captain finally:
🛑 Disconnected the autopilot.
🛑 Moved the thrust levers—but did not push them to TOGA power.
🛑 Entered a steep left bank (52 degrees), causing the nose to drop.
The First Officer’s last recorded words were:
“Sir, we are going down! Sir, we are going down!”
At 4:41:08 UTC, Flight 202 slammed into the Margalla Hills at 2,858 feet.
💥 The aircraft was completely destroyed.
💔 All 152 people onboard perished.
Final Thoughts: The Cost of Cockpit Culture
Airblue Flight 202 is a stark reminder that aviation is not just about technical skill—it’s about teamwork, communication, and humility.
A toxic cockpit culture, combined with a captain’s arrogance, cost 152 lives.
Pilots, take this to heart: If something doesn’t feel right, speak up. Lives depend on it.
Fly safe. 🛫
